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BY RICHARD C. REUBEN
T HE ELECTIVE BRANCHES GET
most of the attention when
we think about democracy.
But it's important to remember that
one of the things that a democratic
government provides is a number of
structures by which disputes may be
resolved peacefully.
Indeed, voting itself is one way
of resolving conflict at a societal
level. In the United States, courts
historically have been the starting
point for the resolution of individual,
and sometimes social, disputes.
Courts would seem to exude a great
deal of democratic legitimacy, but
why, and under what conditions? And
what about other methods of dispute
resolution: How do they relate to
democratic governance, if at all?
In my view, dispute resolution is
an important function of democratic
governance, and when the government
engages in, administers or endorses a
dispute resolution method or process,
we should expect it to operate in a way
that furthers rather than undermines
the larger goal of effective democratic
governance.
This may seem intuitive, but its
implications are profound for dispute
system choice, systems design and
evaluation. Designing and operating
dispute resolution methods and
systems to recognize and maximize
their inherent democratic potential
assures their democratic legitimacy.
The values of democracy
The democratic character of a
dispute resolution method or system
can be assessed by reference to the
fundamental values of democracy.
Richard C. Reuben is
an associate professor at
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If those values are promoted by
a dispute resolution method or
process, it seems reasonable to infer
that the method or process may
enhance democratic governance, and
be seen as more legitimate from a
democratic perspective. On the other
hand, if those values are thwarted
by a dispute resolution process,
then it seems fair to infer that it will
diminish democratic governance,
and be seen as less legitimate from
a democratic perspective. This can
be thought of as dispute resolution's
democratic character, which is not a
moral or normative judgment on the
process. Rather it is an assessment
of its capacity to enhance democratic
governance, which may or not
be fulfilled depending upon how
the dispute resolution method is
implemented.
The many traditional democratic
values can be divided into three major
groups: political values, legal values,
and social capital values. Personal
autonomy is a democratic value that
pervades all three of these categories,
and can sometimes have a trumping
effect when there is tension between
values.
Political values: These are the
values that are perhaps most familiar
when we think of democratic
values, and include participation,
accountability, transparency and
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE
ments of Democratic Legitimacy
for Dispute Resolution
SPersonal Autonomy
The ability of individuals to make their own choices when resolving their
disputes. This value pervades all of the other values.
E(Political Participation
The ability of individuals to take part in the dispute resolution process.
Transparency
The extent to which the dispute resolution process operates in public view.
'Accountability
The degree to which a dispute resolution process and its participants
may be held responsible for the process and outcomes.
fRationality
The extent to which the outcome of a dispute resolution process is
consistent with low, social norms, or public or party expectations.
' Legal Equality
The degree to which a dispute resolution process treats participants the same.
"Due Process
The extent to which a dispute resolution process is procedurally fair.
f ' Social Capital
Whether a dispute resolution process contributes to the larger society or
system, for oxample, by fostering trust in an institution, connection among
people, a spirit of reciprocity, or a sense of public spirit or civil virtue.
Designing and operating dispute resolution methods and
systems to maximize their inherent democratic potential
assures their democratic legitimacy.
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rationality. In the dispute resolution
context, participation refers to the
degree to which the process provides
a party to a dispute the opportunity to
actually participate in its resolution.
Similarly, accountability refers to
the extent to which the process,
or the neutral as a proxy for that
process, may be held responsible.
Transparency refers to the degree to
which the decisional process is visible
to participants and possibly others.
Rationality refers to the extent that
the process leads to an outcome that is
consistent with law, community norms
or some other reasonable measure of
the parties' expectations.
Legal values: These democratic
values are particularly germane to
dispute resolution processes, and
include equality and due process.
Equality generally refers to the equal
treatment of parties within the dispute
resolution process in terms of the
application of relevant laws, norms
or other standards. Due process
refers to the procedural fairness of
the process. Impartiality is a related
value and derives from equality and
due process.
Social capital values: Social capital
values may be less familiar to some, but
political scientists have found that they
are just as important to the exercise
of effective democracy as electoral
politics. These can be thought of as
cultural values, in particular the degree
to which citizens in a democracy have
trust in their public institutions, enjoy
social connections with others, share
a spirit of esprit de corps and engage
in reciprocal beneficial behavior. In
the dispute resolution context, the
question would be whether a dispute
resolution method or system fosters or
frustrates these values.
The baseline: public adjudication
Under these measures, it is
not surprising to find that public
adjudication exhibits a strong
inherent democratic character. Courts
promote public participation in the
development and administration of
the rule of law by allowing parties to
bring actions to enforce legal rights,
through jury service in the government
judicial adjudicatory processes, as
well as through the articulation and
maintenance of societal expectations
with respect to the legal consequences
of conduct that can guide private
ordering.
Similarly, courts promote
equality, due process and rationality
by operating in accordance with
specific rules of procedure, evidence,
and substantive law that have been
enacted pursuant to statutory or
administrative prescription, or that
have evolved over time at common
law. There is also significant
accountability and transparency in
trial court decision-making through
the availability of judicial review of
trial-level decisions, as well as the
public nature of trials and appellate
argument. Finally, as instruments of
the rule of law, courts help generate
a rich reserve of social capital that
further reinforces compliance with the
rule of law.
Particular courts and court
systems are likely to vary in terms of
how well they satisfy each of these
factors, and for these courts, the factors
point to areas where improvement are
appropriate if the courts are to achieve
their maximum potential to enhance
democratic governance.
Arbitration under the FAA
If public adjudication in the
United States provides a baseline
against which the democratic character
of other dispute resolution processes
may be measured, arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act tends
to fall short of the mark in many
important respects. To be sure,
arbitration permits party participation,
arguably at a higher level than
adjudication, considering that the
informality of the arbitration process
can overcome formal barriers to party
participation, such as the prohibitions
against hearsay evidence.
However, arbitration provides
little in terms of accountability.
Arbitration awards are generally not
subject to the kind of substantive
review that is available for decisions
in public adjudication. Arguments
for accountability through the
marketplace are undermined by the
fact that many arbitrations conducted
under the FAA are mandatory-that
is, one of the parties is compelled into
arbitration because of an arbitration
requirement that the other party
unilaterally imposed in the contract
at issue.'
Similarly, transparency and
rationality are not essential values
of arbitration. Arbitrators are not
required to articulate reasons for
their decisions in the form of written
opinions, thus precluding substantive
judicial review and diminishing
the capacity of a written opinion to
enhance the legitimacy of the arbitral
decision by virtue of the transparency
of the decision-maker's reasoning.
Moreover, arbitrators are not required
to make their decisions according
to rules of law, which, while wholly
appropriate in my view, can make their
awards appear arbitrary or capricious to
those unfamiliar with the process.
Because of the enormous
decisional discretion vested in
arbitrators, arbitration does not, and
arguably should not, provide any
assurance of equal treatment of the
parties, at least in the sense of the
application of substantive rules. To
the contrary, arbitration provides a
highly individualized form of justice
that is narrowly tailored to the
specific circumstances presented to
the arbitrator, who makes a decision
according to whatever substantive
standard he or she determines is
appropriate under the circumstances,
unless the submission to arbitration
specifies otherwise. On the other
hand, arbitration does provide for
equal treatment in the sense of
procedural due process, generally
assuring that both parties within the
arbitration will be treated equally
with respect to the presentation of
evidence to the arbitrator. While the
practices of individual arbitrators in
this regard may vary considerably, the
market for arbitration cases and other
reputational concerns tend to constrain
abuse of discretion by arbitrators.
Arbitration is thus a process
that does not have a high inherent
democratic character. However, this
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE24 WINTER 2006
is where personal autonomy can
have a trumping effect, legitimizing
an inherently less democratic
process. Parties may, and in some
circumstances should, choose to waive
the democratic failings of arbitration in
favor of the other virtues the process
offers. To be effective, the choice of
arbitration must be real, not implied
or imputed from consent to the larger
contract.
Mediation
As a dispute resolution process
that requires the consent of the parties
before a dispute can be resolved,
mediation may generally be seen
as an inherently more democratic
process than an adjudicatory process
like arbitration. However, the
enormous variety of styles, practices
and applications of mediation raise
uncertainty on several democratic
elements-a dynamic that gives
rise to some of the most significant,
contentious and largely unresolved
policy issues in the field.
In my view, democratic theory
would suggest the answers to these
fundamental dilemmas again may
be ascertained by reference to the
autonomy value - that is, the capacity
for mediation to foster true and
meaningful autonomy for the parties
in the resolution of their disputes.
The political democratic factors
present a particularly mixed bag, in
part because of the adaptability of
mediation to unique circumstances
that makes the process valuable in
the first place. While the mediation
process allows for a high degree
of participation by disputants, the
transparency of the process greatly
depends upon the particular mediation
format that is used.
For example, many believe
confidentiality to be a crucial value for
mediation. Yet it comes at the cost of
process transparency. As the Uniform
Mediation Act and other state laws
suggest, this is a trade-off most states
are willing to make, at least to some
extent.
But consider, too, questions
over the appropriateness of caucus
in mediation. From a democratic
theory perspective, noncaucus models
are plainly more transparent than
the arguably more common models
in which private caucuses are used,
and through which information
crucial to settlement is deliberately
shielded from one of the parties by
the mediator and the other party,
absent party consent to disclosure.
Indeed, maintaining the appearance
of neutrality while working effectively
with private caucus information is
a central challenge for practicing
mediators who work with the caucus
format. Surely this shield of the caucus
works both ways, in that mediators
will typically caucus with both parties.
However, one should not confuse
even-handedness with transparency.
Caucuses shield information, and that
is the antithesis of transparency.
Similarly, mediation is not a
particularly rational process-certainly
as compared with our baseline of
public adjudication-because one
of the strengths of the process is the
ability of the parties to make decisions
about the outcomes of their disputes
according to values and standards that
are uniquely important to them rather
than according to predetermined legal,
workplace or other standards. As a
result, decision-making in mediation
can be more of an idiosyncratic
process, rather than one necessarily
guided by more objective rationality.
While this is entirely appropriate,
it can raise an enormous practical
challenge in assessing the substantive
fairness of a mediated settlement
agreement, particularly one that falls
well short of what the law may provide
but which may satisfy other interests
of the parties, including just getting
the dispute over with.
The mediation process is similarly
ambiguous on the final political
value, accountability. On the one
hand, because mediation parties are
not required to settle, they arguably
have all the accountability they need.
However, this view does not take into
account coercive pressures that the
mediator can bring to bear on parties in
mediation, particularly mediators who
use a more directive or cajoling style,
as well as other settlement pressures,
such as time, resources and the need
for a party to move on.
Moreover, this view focuses on
particular disputes, and a look at the
system as a whole underscores the
lack of accountability in mediation.
Mediators are not licensed or
certified in most states, and so are
not accountable to public oversight
other than through private actions
for malpractice or ethical lapses and
through the reputational market for
mediator services. Moreover, unlike
most contracts, the results of mediated
settlement agreements are generally
not reviewable for substantive fairness,
or even unconscionability. While in
most cases there is no need for such
review, democracy's concern would
be with those cases for which review
is appropriate because of undue
mediator coercion, incompetence or
other reasons.
Finally, the mediation process
raises similar democratic ambiguity
on the legal values of due process
and equality. A standard practice of
mediators is to work with the parties to
establish ground rules for the conduct
of the mediation to which both parties
agree, and this is strongly democratic
in terms of assuring procedural due
process. However, these components
of democratic dispute resolution
implicate concerns over mediator style
in general and competence to manage
power imbalances between the
parties in particular. The traditional
theoretical divide on mediator style
is between facilitative and evaluative
mediation, or what Professor Leonard
Riskin has more recently termed
"elicitative" and "directive."'
In my view, democratic theory
holds no preference for one over the
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Mediation has a stronger inherent democratic character
than arbitration. But how that character plays out in
particular cases will depend upon how it is implemented.
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other. Facilitative mediation has great
power to enhance party autonomy in
the resolution of a dispute, assuming
the mediator is skillful in managing
power disparities between the
parties. If the mediator is not capable
of managing a power imbalance
effectively, however, the result can
be the suppression of the meaningful
autonomy of the low-power party,
or, worse yet, the direct or indirect
coercion of that party's choices.
Similarly, in the best of worlds,
evaluative mediation can foster
meaningful party autonomy by
providing a hard-headed third-party
assessment of a party's claims. In the
worst, it can be just another tool of
suppression and coercion, the antithesis
of party empowerment. Particularly
in more extreme situations, such a
dynamic could raise significant issues
regarding the substantive fairness of
the mediated settlement agreements,
as well as the equality of treatment of
the low-power party.
In sum, mediation has a stronger
inherent democratic character than
arbitration. But as with arbitration,
how that democratic character plays
out in particular cases will depend
upon how it is implemented.
Social capital values
We have not yet considered
the social capital values for either
arbitration or mediation. Assuming
the choices made along the other
dimensions have been more
democratic, then it is fair to infer that
the dispute resolution process itself
may help to contribute to democratic
social capital by fostering greater
public trust in dispute resolution
decisions, encouraging constructive
social connections with others,
fostering a spirit of esprit de corps
and community engagement and
by rewarding reciprocal beneficial
behavior.
If, however, the choices made
along the other dimensions have
been less democratic, then it is fair
to infer that the dispute resolution
process itself may undermine the
effectiveness of democracy. The
picture is not pretty.
Emerging theory regarding trust
in public institutions suggests that
less democratic dispute resolution
processes may carry significant
systemic costs by eroding public trust
in the rule of law as an institution. As
the Rodney King riots suggested a
decade ago, loss of public trust in the
rule of law is not a trifling matter.
There are also important
implications for the willingness
of citizens to comply with the law
voluntarily. As an empirical matter,
the relationship between trust and
rule-compliance has been studied
extensively in the context of citizen
compliance with legal rules. A leading
researcher, New York University
social psychologist Tom R. Tyler, has
consistently found across studies that
trust in legal institutions far exceeds
other factors-including agreement
in the substantive correctness of the
law-as the primary determinant of
the willingness to comply with legal
rules.4
More specifically, Tyler's research
suggests people are most willing
to comply with the law when it is
perceived to be legitimate in the sense
that it is entitled to or deserving of
compliance. Tyler has further found
that the primary determinants of this
sense of legitimacy or entitlement are
the procedural fairness of the decision-
making process and an underlying trust
in the motives of legal authorities.5
Here the research is striking,
showing that it is the integrity of the
process by which the rule is developed
and applied-the processes and
behaviors of legal authorities-that
determines whether these initially
trusting expectations are met or
defeated, not substantive agreement
with the rule. What is equally striking
is that the referent points that are most
salient in making the determination
of procedural integrity are generally
consistent with the very factors
identified above as being central to
democratic legitimacy: whether the
authorities allow people to influence
the outcome (participation), allow
people to speak and present evidence
(participation), behave neutrally (due
process), treat people with dignity
and respect (due process), explain
judgments (rationality) and provide
desired outcomes (rationality).
While striking, the consistency
of these values as a baseline for
assessment across contexts is not
surprising. Rather, it bears testament
to how deeply these fundamental
democratic values are entrenched, and
to how little difference context makes
to our need for their fulfillment.
In sum, dispute resolution is a
fundamental component of democratic
governance, and it is important for the
dispute resolution method or process
to be designed or operated in a way
that is consistent with traditional
democratic values. Doing so will inure
to the benefit of the dispute resolution
process, and for the larger system of
dispute resolution that serves and
supports our democracy.
Endnotes
For a more comprehensive, and footnoted,
discussion of the issues raised in this article,
see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 279 (Winter/Spring
2004) and Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and
Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the
New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11
(Spring 2005) (discussing issues in context of
new, more democratic workplaces).
2 Some would question whether these
arbitrations in fact are mandatory. See, e.g.,
Stephen I. Ware, Employment Arbitration and
Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83,
105-10 (1996). For a response, see Reuben,
The Problem of Arbitration, supra note 1, at
303-08.
1 Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in
Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New
New Grid System,79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29-
34 (2003).
4 The most significant of this research focused
on citizen contact with police and courts as
a proxy for what I describe here as the rule of
law. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the
Law: A Political Perspective, U.CIN.L.REv. 847,
856-858 (1998).
Id. at 866. Interestingly, Tyler's research
suggests that people tend to begin with a
benevolent outlook about the noble motives
of government officials with respect to law-
making and application, which he calls an
"illusion of benevolence" that is subsequently
tested by actual contacts with government
authorities. Id. at 868-869.
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